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environments is directly impacted by the
systems that shape that environment.
Harrison’s discussion of the opponent—
whether a transnational terrorist organization or a corporate competitor—as
a universal dimension of strategy builds
on his understanding of systems. While
one can seek to change the external
environment in one’s favor by strategizing against a system—for example, U.S.
efforts to promote democracy in the
Middle East as a long-term strategy to
prevent radicalization and extremism
—there is a more direct approach
available against individual opponents.
Businessmen can assess their competitors’ products and decide to invest in
specific market areas where they perceive opponents to be weak. Nationalsecurity strategists can recommend the
implementation of counterinsurgency
strategies focused on protecting local
populations because they perceive opponents to be alienating the citizenry.
Finally, Harrison discusses the impact
of groups on strategy, whether citizens organizing to protest a business’s
environmental record or mass public
opinion impacting the strategies of governments. By enunciating his concept of
groups, systems, and opponents, Harrison performs the service of providing
broad categories encompassing virtually
all the actors that confront strategists
of either a commercial or security bent.
In so doing he underlines the point
that regardless of the area of endeavor,
a strategist will face conceptual frameworks very similar to those facing
colleagues in other fields. An important addition to the study of strategy,
Strategic Thinking in 3D does much
to expand the traditional understanding of strategic theory from a narrow
subject lacking commonality between
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multiple fields of activity to a universal
framework for achieving one’s goals.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY

Washington, D.C.

Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: TwentyFirst-Century Combat as Politics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. 256pp. $32.50

Emile Simpson served in Afghanistan as
an infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha
Rifles. At first glance, the book might
appear to be an account of his experiences there; in fact, however, it is a sophisticated examination of twenty-firstcentury warfare and of the employment
of the military instrument of power.
Its front cover is embellished with the
endorsement “Deserves to be seen as
a coda to [Prussian military theorist/
philosopher Carl von] Clausewitz’s On
War.” This is no small feat, and Simpson
delivers an intellectually sophisticated
account of the changed nature of warfare, examining war through two lenses.
The first lens is the traditional use of
armed force to seek to create military
conditions within which a political
settlement can be reached. Second, he
examines armed force deployed for a
distinctly political purpose. While these
modes are by no means mutually exclusive and can be employed by the same
actor at the same time against the same
enemy, Simpson asserts that understanding the difference between these two is
essential to achieving national-security
objectives in the twenty-first century.
Simpson continually refers to two ideas
from Clausewitz. The first is polarity—
the simple idea that wars are usually
contests fought between two sides. The
second idea is that traditionally, strategic
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audiences are contained within the
nation-state structure. When war is a
contest between two sides, the audiences
are easy to identify, and traditionally
these audiences understand the outcome of the war in terms of the contest
between the armed forces of the sides.
When multiple strategic audiences, some
of them not contained within or associated with nation-states, do not understand or interpret the military outcome
in the same way, “the military outcome
does not provide a stable basis upon
which to define a conflict’s outcome.”
Simpson argues that “strategic confusion
can result when conflicts characterized
by competition between many actors in
a fragmented political environment are
shoehorned into a traditional concept of
war, which is two polarized sides.” The
information revolution and advances
in communications and social media
have exacerbated this problem, forcing
overlap not only between the tactical
and strategic levels of war but between
the tactical and policy levels as well.

have weighed in on the changed nature
of warfare in the twenty-first century,
such as David Kilcullen, Colonel Gian
Gentile, and Antonio Giustozzi. A
visiting defense fellow at Oxford in
2011, Simpson fuses a firm grasp of
traditional humanities and philosophy
with his experience in Afghanistan.

Simpson describes war as a competition
between strategic narratives. Accordingly, planners at all levels should be
targeting strategic audiences as centers
of gravity. It is a matter not so much of
the Clausewitzian dictum that war is
designed to compel your enemy to do
your will but of compelling your target
audience to understand your message.
War from the Ground Up provides case
studies for this proposition ranging
from the coalition effort in Afghanistan
in 2006 to the British strategy in the
Borneo conflict in the mid-1960s. The
author also addresses other insurgencies throughout the narrative, including
the conflict in Sri Lanka and Russian
operations in Chechnya, and refers to
the work of prominent authors who

Andrew S. Erickson is a leading authority on Chinese naval developments.
His research and linguistic abilities are
matched by his careful, systematic analysis. In this work Erickson thoroughly
surveys the existing literature in English
and Chinese addressing Beijing’s efforts
to deploy antiship ballistic missiles
(ASBMs) able to strike large warships at
ranges of more than a thousand miles.
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He has provided us with what may be
one of the most important books on
strategy in a long time. No short review
can do justice to this remarkable book,
which should be read by all military
officers and policy makers, as well as
anyone involved with the planning
and execution of military operations.
JEFFREY SHAW

Naval War College

Erickson, Andrew S. Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications. Washington, D.C.:
Jamestown Foundation, 2013. 110pp. $18

The author credits China with developing ASBMs as part of its strategy of “using the land to control the sea.” However,
this represents a misinterpretation of naval history. While it is true that “a ship’s a
fool to fight a fort,” it is also true that no
nation has successfully defeated a naval
force with land power alone. Examples
include President Thomas Jefferson’s
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